

head of the contracting activity has determined that the cost of calculating and tracking collateral savings will exceed the benefits to be derived (see 48.201(e)).

(b) The contractor's share of collateral savings may range from 20 to 100 percent of the estimated savings to be realized during a typical year of use but must not exceed the greater of—

(1) The contract's firm-fixed-price, target price, target cost, or estimated cost, at the time the VECP is accepted; or

(2) \$100,000.

(c) The contracting officer must determine the sharing rate for each VECP.

(d) In determining collateral savings, the contracting officer must consider any degradation of performance, service life, or capability.

[64 FR 51848, Sept. 24, 1999]

48.104-4 Sharing alternative—no-cost settlement method.

In selecting an appropriate mechanism for incorporating a VECP into a contract, the contracting officer shall analyze the different approaches available to determine which one would be in the Government's best interest. Contracting officers should balance the administrative costs of negotiating a settlement against the anticipated savings. A no-cost settlement may be used if, in the contracting officer's judgment, reliance on other VECP approaches likely would not be more cost-effective, and the no-cost settlement would provide adequate consideration to the Government. Under this method of settlement, the contractor would keep all of the savings on the instant contract, and all savings on its concurrent contracts only. The Government would keep all savings resulting from concurrent contracts placed with other sources, savings from all future contracts, and all collateral savings. Use of this method must be by mutual agreement of both parties for individual VECPs.

[63 FR 34079, June 22, 1998. Redesignated at 64 FR 51847, Sept. 24, 1999]

48.105 Relationship to other incentives.

Contractors should be offered the fullest possible range of motivation, yet the benefits of an accepted VECP should not be rewarded both as value engineering shares and under performance, design-to-cost, or similar incentives of the contract. To that end, when performance, design-to-cost, or similar targets are set and incentivized, the targets of such incentives affected by the VECP are not to be adjusted because of the acceptance of the VECP. Only those benefits of an accepted VECP not rewardable under other incentives are rewarded under a value engineering clause.

[48 FR 42443, Sept. 19, 1983, as amended at 54 FR 5057, Jan. 31, 1989]

Subpart 48.2—Contract Clauses

48.201 Clauses for supply or service contracts.

(a) *General.* The contracting officer shall insert a value engineering clause in solicitations and contracts when the contract amount is expected to be \$100,000 or more, except as specified in subparagraphs (1) through (5) and in paragraph (f) below. A value engineering clause may be included in contracts of lesser value if the contracting officer sees a potential for significant savings. Unless the chief of the contracting office authorizes its inclusion, the contracting officer shall *not* include a value engineering clause in solicitations and contracts—

(1) For research and development other than full-scale development;

(2) For engineering services from not-for-profit or nonprofit organizations;

(3) For personal services (see subpart 37.1);

(4) Providing for product or component improvement, unless the value engineering incentive application is restricted to areas not covered by provisions for product or component improvement;

(5) For commercial products (see part 11) that do not involve packaging specifications or other special requirements or specifications; or